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‘A Pleasingly Blank Canvas’: Urban Regeneration in
Northern Ireland and the Case of Titanic Quarter
PHIL RAMSEY
Abstract. The ongoing development of Titanic Quarter in Belfast, Northern
Ireland, has already made significant changes to the area. The site on which
the Titanic was built has been redeveloped as an area for tourism, business,
education and the creative industries. The site has been developed following
a significant inflow of private capital, and with the additional support of
local government and public finance. This article outlines how economic and
political forces have coalesced in Belfast to the point that the violent period
of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland can be said to have created a ‘pleasingly
blank canvas for regeneration’.
Belfast is unique amongWestern European cities in that more than half of
its city centre has yet to be redeveloped, creating a pleasingly blank
canvas for regeneration (Harcourt Developments, 2007, p. 44).
1. Introduction
The ethno-political conflict in Northern Ireland—colloquially known as the ‘Trou-
bles’—lasted roughly from1968 to 1998, in itsmost recent and violent phase. Chart-
ing a beginning and end to the Troubles is difficult, as the conflict was rooted in
centuries of strife and political turmoil, and some violence remains to the present
day. This period in Northern Ireland (NI) was marked by economic stagnation in
the province, marked by high levels of unemployment (compared to Great
Britain). Reports in 2010 showed that, in the twelve years since the ‘Good Friday
Agreement’ was signed, unemployment stood at the same level, and economic
inactivity for the NI population aged 16-64 at 28.6 per cent (compared to the UK
average of 23.2 per cent) (Magee, 2010). The UK Treasury’s ‘subvention’ to NI
was realised in higher levels of public sector spending compared to England,
Scotland andWales, as theNI economy struggled “to keeppacewith the restructur-
ing of the British economy in the 1970s and 1980s. . .” (Darby, 2003). When the
Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was signed in 1998 (NIO, 1998)—bringing relative
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political stability—many politicians and business people hoped that large amounts
of capital would flow into NI, thus stimulating the private sector. This article
discusses how the effects of political and economic change in NI were played out
in the development of the built-environment, as seen in the development of
Titanic Quarter (TQ).
Titanic Quarter, situated on banks of the River Lagan in the capital city Belfast, is
a mixed residential, commercial and leisure space, at the site where the Titanic was
constructed. It is similar to many other riverside development projects around the
world, and has seen the inflow of both large amounts of private capital and public
finance, as outlined later in this article. This has contributed towards filling space
left over from the period of heavy industry andmanufacturing (largely focused on
ship building) that defined the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in major UK
ports. This article engages with the arguments put forward by the developers of
TQ that TQ is intended for the wider benefit of Northern Irish society and its
economy, and posits that the emergence of TQ must be seen in the wider
context of the implementation of marketisation and economic liberalisation,
trends that have underpinned the development of what is often described as
the ‘new Northern Ireland’. The paper argues that such claims are unfounded,
and that the development of projects like TQ primarily serve the interests of capi-
talist development, rather than having an extensive social and economic benefit
for the wider Northern Ireland population. Methodologically, this article is a
desk-based study of numerous sources, including academic research, reports
from government and research organisations, company documentation from the
lead developer of the TQ site, and journalistic articles from the British Broadcast-
ing Company (BBC) and other sources. Since these secondary sources come from a
diverse range of actors and organisations, reliance on these sources is not undue.
2. Establishing ‘Conventional Economics’ in Northern Ireland
The key ideological message driven by both the Irish and British states is
that peace dividends are to be achieved through conventional economics.
A dropping unemployment rate, additional and religiously mixed
middle-income employment and a vibrant city-centre nightlife are meant
to show that Belfast is ‘booming’ in a different way (Shirlow, 2006, p. 101).
In his discussion of Belfast as a ‘post-conflict’ city, Shirlow (2006) outlines the
approach that is increasingly being taken to understand NI. Following the cessa-
tion of the worst violence from the Troubles, Belfast is now seen as a site ripe for
the implementation of ‘conventional economics’, evidenced in the expansion of
the market economy, the push for foreign direct investment, the withdrawal
of the state from the market to bring it more into line with Great Britain and
other west European states, and speculation in the land and property market.
This approach can be effectively summarised by a statement from Colin Lewis
of Invest NI, (a public body that supports the private sector): “Once Belfast
had a terrible reputation and now it’s regarded as normal” (as cited in Neill,
2006, p. 112). For Invest NI, normalisation involves the goal of increasing
“business productivity and boost[ing] Northern Ireland’s Gross Value Added
(GVA) per employee, which is around 20 per cent lower that the UK average”
(Invest Northern Ireland, 2012, p. 1). Such a policy position flows from the
positions of successive British governments, and the settled position of New
Labour post-1998 (after the signing of the GFA, when it was held that NI must
begin to stand on its feet economically), and reinforced in the ‘St. Andrews Agree-
ment’ (NIO, 2007). Bairner (2006) notes that while such documents ratify relative
levels of peace and stability, property developers and others had already decided
to target NI as a site of much untapped potential: “Capital investors did not need
to wait for a formal document to realise that the cessation of widespread random
acts of violence together with the IRA’s focus on economic and prestige targets in
England had turned Belfast into place where rich profits could be made” (Bairner,
2006, p. 125). Indeed, Belfast was seen by investors as a site ripe for investment,
encapsulated in the publication of reports such as Economics in Peacemaking:
Lessons from Northern Ireland (Portland Trust, 2007).
In the private housing market in NI, prices that had been kept low for decades
due to the Troubles (as compared to similar housing in the Republic of Ireland
(ROI) and Great Britain) rose sharply in value. The Nationwide bank reported
in 2007 that
House prices in Northern Ireland fell in the wake of the violence and the
manufacturing decline of the 1970s but began to rise again in the early
1990s when the peace process gathered momentum and the growth of
manufacturing in Northern Ireland started to outpace growth of this
sector in the rest of the UK (as cited in Portland Trust, 2007, p. 3).
In the built-environment, the biggest changes that occurred were in the private
homes market. Belfast became populated with cheap and quickly constructed
apartment complexes, designed in a way as to make them indistinguishable
from other UK or European cities. While the housing market had previously
been marked by an absence of private apartments (such dwellings mostly being
used as social housing), these soon became a feature along Belfast’s Lagan
River, not far from the site of TQ. From 2007 onwards, NI house prices went
into decline, with the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors finding that
average house prices fell 48 per cent between the peak of the market and 2012
(as cited in Canning, 2012). Given that a lot of investment in NI was from the
ROI, when the Irish housing market collapsed many Irish investors could no
longer service their debts. As a result, many NI assets transferred into the owner-
ship of the ROI government’s ‘bad bank’, the National Asset Management
Agency, (NAMA, established in December 2009). As of 2012, NAMA held £3.35
billion worth of property in NI (4 per cent of NAMA’s total assets) (Fitzpatrick,
2012). In June 2012, as though to highlight the severity of the house price
problem in NI, the chairman of the global-national bank Royal Bank of Scotland
(RBS) Sir Philip Hampton, singled out its Irish division as the company’s
biggest cause for concern. Hampton stated that the Ulster Bank had “overdosed”
on property development, and that the RBS “simply didn’t expect the scale of pro-
blems in Ireland” (BBC, 2012a). While this is reflective of the Ulster Bank’s activi-
ties throughout the whole of Ireland (in both NI and the ROI), it is worth noting
that the population of NI is relatively small, estimated in 2012 at approximately
1.81 million people (NISRA, 2012). Restated, NI contributed in proportionately
high terms to the failure at RBS, encapsulated by its 82 per cent nationalisation
in 2008 by the UK government (BBC, 2012b), and its posting of the biggest
annual loss in UK corporate history. NI is sometimes lauded as ‘punching
above its weight’ in terms of culture (sport, music, film) on the UK stage, but in
this case it punched above its weight in terms of financial collapse in the UK prop-
erty market. Today, while NI’s economy remains in a better condition compared to
that of the ROI, UK Treasury public spending cuts put NI in a precarious position
(Kaufmann, 2012). This situation means that NI’s politicians have difficult econ-
omic choices to make, such as the cut in corporation tax that some propose, to
bring NI in line with the taxation rate in the ROI. Another issue is the extent to
which NI politicians continue to use the state to fund private sector development,
given that developments such as TQ show that property developers are often the
primary benefactors, at the expense of economic development that has a wider
social impact.
3. The ‘New Northern Ireland’
The drive for the establishment of ‘conventional economics’ in NI is often
accompanied by a discourse that has emerged, seen clearly in the descriptor the
‘New Northern Ireland’. Here, the ‘New Northern Ireland’ tends to denote that
the country has shifted from violence and conflict to a post-conflict, consumer
society, where sectarianism and social ills are swept aside by gentrification. The
discourse of the ‘New Northern Ireland’, defines itself in difference to the ‘Old
Northern Ireland’ (though this phrase is rarely used); which by implication can
be taken to refer to a backward and underdeveloped country, blighted by political
violence and the ‘ills’ of an underdeveloped market economy. This can be evi-
denced in voluntary and third sector documentation. In a recent ‘Community
Relations’ Council report, Nolan (2012) argues that: “A new, confident, and
neutral urban culture has emerged”, where in Belfast and Londonderry, “Atten-
tion has focused more on the relaxed environment of the city centres, which
now boast a new ‘cappuccino culture’” (Nolan, 2012, p. 10). In response to
Nolan we can think here of Sharon Zukin’s phrase, “pacification by cappuccino”
(as cited in Harvey, 2008, p. 31), where progress in NI is measured according to the
availability of ‘frothy coffee’. Further evidence is provided by Nolan in the form of
the hosting of the MTV Europe Music Awards in Belfast in 2011, and Londonder-
ry’s status as the ‘2012 UK City of Culture’. For corroboration, Nolan points to the
Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (NILT) and work by the Institute for Con-
flict Research (ICR), which indicate that there are more perceived ‘neutral’ areas
than in the past, including shopping areas (Hamilton et al., 2008). However,
these areas often exist alongside segregated areas, where residential segregation
is the primary form of segregation, alongside education and access to sporting
facilities (Byrne et al., 2006; Hamilton et al., 2008). Nolan (2012) does accept that
“geographical and class boundaries persist” (p. 10), the thrust of his argument
is that a ‘New Northern Ireland’ has emerged, and that this is a positive thing:
“For those with the means to participate, though, the new consumer culture is
nonetheless real and marks a stage in the journey away from street violence,
and towards a new sense of identity for Northern Ireland” (Nolan, 2012, p. 10).
Harvey (2008), writing on urban development, argues that
Even the incoherent, bland and monotonous suburban tract develop-
ment that continues to dominate in many areas now gets its antidote in
a ‘new urbanism’ movement that touts the sale of community and bou-
tique lifestyles to fulfill urban dreams (p. 32).
”Fulfilling urban dreams” through ”boutique lifestyles” has a relatively short
history in NI, due to the impact of the Troubles, and the accompanying lack of
development of the retail and leisure sectors. Shirlow (2006) and Bairner (2006)
outline the role of consumption and the construction of consumer spaces in NI.
Shirlow (2006) notes that in Belfast: “The construction of the Castle Court shop-
ping mall, out of glass in a zone of conflict, in the 1980s was a key symbol of
state control and increasing confidence. Future state expenditure on the riverfront
and the use of funds to create a modern cityscape also indicated the desire to
present a normal place” (pp. 100–101). Moreover, Bairner (2006) draws on the
development of Victoria Square—the successor to Castle Court, ostensibly mar-
keted at a ‘boutique’ lifestyle—and criticises the extent to which the development
of a ‘city centre public realm’ is a positive step. He argues
First, there is the implication that more shops mean happier citizens and
indeed that building projects are directly linked to the emergence of a
society free from political violence—hence, ‘the better and brighter
future’ that is promised (Bairner, 2006, p. 129).
This was seen clearly in an advertising banner that was draped around cranes at
the construction site of Victoria Square which read: “A renaissance for Belfast”
(McAllister, 2009, p. 19). While both sites respectively were seen at the time of con-
struction as being emblematic of change—Castle Court in the early stages of peace
and progress, Victoria Square in the property boom years—both were ultimately
sites of capital accumulation that witnessed substantial decline for their owners. In
2012, Castle Court was sold by the multi-nationalWestfield, reportedly nowworth
half of the £350 million it was worth before the crash (BBC, 2012c). In 2011, Victoria
Square had lost £29 million from its original valuation of £349 million in 2008, with
the German company CGI Hausinvest taking the loss (BBC, 2011).
4. Remaining Segregation in Belfast
Shirlow and Murtagh’s (2006) description of Belfast goes some way to grasping
the complexity of the city
It is one of those places within which history, identity and culture are
played out, in a dramatic and public manner, through the instruments
of threat, menace, violence and deviance (p. 2).
Despite the major improvements in levels of peace compared to the worst years of
the Troubles, and major changes in the provision of leisure and shopping facilities,
Belfast remains a deeply divided and segregated city (Shirlow and Murtagh,
2006), with the population largely divided along sectarian lines in terms of
housing, and with 93.5 per cent of children educated in separate Catholic and Pro-
testant schools (Nolan, 2012). This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that when
the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998 there were 22 peace walls, but
by 2010 there were 48 (Nolan, 2012, p. 71). Additionally—based on work
carried out by the Belfast Interface Project (2012)—there are 99 “different security
barriers and forms of defensive architecture across the city associated with resi-
dential areas” (p. 11). This contributes to a situation where the “vast majority of
segregated residential districts are working class, spaces which hosted nearly all
sectarian violence” (Nagle, 2009a, p. 328). The city centre of Belfast remains con-
tested, where Nationalists have sought equal access to what was once Unionist
“sacred space” (Nagle, 2009b), seen clearly in the riots that emanated after Belfast
City Council voted in 2012 to only fly the Union Jack (UK flag) over the city hall on
certain dates, rather than every day of the year. Into this context, Shirlow and
Murtagh’s point, that “divided cities are places of passion, commitment and
unwavering belief” (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006, p. 2), seems as prevalent as
ever. Indeed, we can turn Nagle and Clancy (2012), when summarising the pre-
vailing positions of many scholars working on Northern Irish issues, show that
“social segregation and political polarisation appear to be intensifying” (p. 79).
5. Titanic Quarter: Outlining the Project
TQ stands in a long line of post-industrial waterfront regeneration projects seen
around the world, with land being changed from industrial usage to use for
housing, leisure and the creative and service industries. Similar sites that
helped inform the plans for TQ include Malmo (Sweden), Barcelona (Spain) and
the Leith Ocean Terminal (Scotland, where the Royal Yacht Brittannia is kept)
(Titanic Quarter, 2005). A number of other studies have focused on waterfront
developments in various settings around the world: Desfor and Jørgensen
(2004) address flexible governance practices in development in Copenhagen;
Ferreira and Visser (2007) focus on the case of the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront
in Cape Town; Jauhiainen (1995) looked at Barcelona, Cardiff and Genoa; while
McCarthy (1998) focused on the waterfront in Dundee, Scotland. While at the
development stage, Jones (1998) reviews a range of UK projects; while Richard
Marshall’s collection Waterfronts in Post Industrial Cities (2001) surveyed settings
as diverse as Bilbao and Shanghai. Specifically in the case of TQ in Belfast, the
establishment of the project was foregrounded by the Laganside Development
Corporation, a public body established by the Northern Ireland Office (ministry
of the UK government) with the aim of regenerating the area around the Lagan
River that had largely fallen into disuse. Quoting from architects Shepheard,
Epstein and Hunter/BDP, Neill (2006) notes that there was an impetus in
Belfast, “to transform completely the environmental quality of a vital part of the
City, and by this means to help transform perceptions of Belfast at an international
level” (p. 109). Shirlow and Murtagh (2006), call Laganside “Belfast’s most suc-
cessful attempt to spatially construct the growth economy. . .” (p. 164). In oper-
ation from 1989-2007, the primary corporate aim of the Laganside Development
Corporation was: “To secure the regeneration of the Laganside designated area
to the stage where private sector development and investment will continue
without major public intervention” (p. 2). However, criticisms of Laganside
were heard from different quarters, as Shirlow and Murtagh summarise, Lagan-
side was criticised by William Neill as: “an exclusive Thatcherite property
project that failed to connect with the city’s disadvantaged and margianalised”
(Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006, p. 165), while the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development argued that it had failed to “impact on the
poorest people and areas” (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006, p. 166). Despite this,
the valedictory report from Laganside states that following the work of the
Laganside Corporation, the area around the Lagan River had become a “place
of opportunity for all” (Laganside Corporation, 2007, p. 10), a theme the report
repeats multiple times. In terms of the timing of the setting up of Laganside, trig-
gering the wider development of the area around the River Lagan and the later
development of TQ, it should be noted that the impetus for state supported
capitalist development of the built-environment preceded the arrival of peace.
As Laganside was set up in 1989, this came some five years before the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) ceasefire of 1994. Before relative peace was secured
(many atrocities were still to follow), the regeneration of this area of Belfast was
in the planning stage. Across the River Lagan from TQ, and about 0.5km away,
the Belfast Waterfront (originally the Waterfront Hall) was opened in 1997, with
the purpose of hosting international concerts and conferences. Built and operated
by Belfast City Council, the venue has a place in the history books of the Northern
Ireland peace process, as it was the location in May 1998 that the Nobel Peace Prize
winners John Hume and David Trimble appeared together on stage in an unprece-
dented show of unity ahead of the referendum on the GFA. One of the first build-
ings at the site where TQ is located was the Odyssey Arena, an indoor stadium and
leisure facility, hosting international concerts and home to the British Ice Hockey
team, the Belfast Giants. Opened in 2000, the project was part-funded by the Lagan-
side Development Corporation. Like the Belfast Waterfront, it hosts international
concerts, and also conferences, albeit on a much larger scale.
TQ is a site totaling 185 acres, situated at Queen’s Island, where the Titanic was
built, at the end of Belfast Lough (in east Belfast). The land where TQ is located is:
“owned by Belfast Harbour Commissioners and leased to Titanic Quarter Limited
and Titanic Properties Limited” (Titanic Quarter, 2005, p. 2). Despite being termed
by one of the involved parties as “one of the world’s largest city centre regener-
ation projects” (Titanic Quarter, 2005, p. 2), the site is not part of the ‘city centre’
which is approximately 1 km away (in terms of the CBD), and is rather different
in terms of its lack of major shopping outlets compared to the CBD. As noted
above, Belfast city centre remains contested, while the area in which TQ is
located is not. The initial Development Framework for TQ planned for
Up to 5000 dwellings including apartments and townhouses; A high
quality business quarter. The total business/office/R&D floor space
will be 180,000m2; Commercial development of some 130 000m2
(Titanic Quarter, 2005, p. 2).
Future plans include the inclusion of a “24-acre Science Park; 600 000 sq ft Finan-
cial Services Centre; 1.4m sq ft commercial space . . . 64 000 sq ft movie studio . . .
up to five hotels; 450,000 sq ft leisure space” (Titanic Belfast, 2011, p. 11). As of
2012, there are some 80 companies based there (including Citi Group and Micro-
soft) and 474 completed apartments, alongside the Public Records Office of NI,
and a campus of the city’s further education college. Visitors to TQ find a fairly
pleasant and interesting space, albeit one which remains quite sparsely filled. It
has retained an aura of its maritime past—one can stand on the site where the
Titanic was constructed—but gives plenty of clues to its raison d’eˆtre as a space
for capital accumulation, especially in the apartment blocks that appear garish
alongside some buildings at TQ that are over one hundred years old. A relative
coup for TQ has been the number of high-profile film and television productions
that have been filmed in ‘The Paint Hall’, currently leased to Northern Ireland
Screen. The building was formerly used for painting Harland and Wolff ships,
but has been used as a location for films such as City of Ember (2008) and Your High-
ness (2011), and for the major HBO television series Game of Thrones (2011—)
(Titanic Belfast, 2011). The Paint Hall was expanded and renamed Titanic
Studios in March 2012. Referring to the production of Game of Thrones, the NI
First Minister Peter Robinson stated: “The transformation of the Paint Hall from
the last remnant of our once great ship building tradition to the largest stage in
Europe is an example of our flexibility and our commitment to innovation”
(BBC, 2010). While engaged in the creative industries (as emblematic of the new
economy), the developer Harcourt also seeks to tie TQ to history, stating: “Once
more, the area will be the engine room for the city’s growth and economic prosper-
ity, while building on and celebrating the maritime history of the area” (Harcourt
Developments, 2007, p. 15), and that TQ is “firmly rooted in the history and char-
acter of Belfast” (Titanic Quarter, 2006). The shift is cast in post-industrial terms by
Harcourt Developments, both reflecting and underpinning Belfast’s shift from a
manufacturing super-power (at its peak it was one of the largest ship builders
in the world): “Where once they grew ships, we’re now going to grow a commu-
nity – one of the finest residential, working, educational and office communities.”
(Harcourt Developments, 2007, p. 30). But such a claim is rather misleading,
suggesting that ship building and post-industrial office spaces in Belfast can be
interchangeable, in terms of the employment opportunities they offer. Rather,
east Belfast has never managed to replace the jobs that were lost with the mass
decline in ship building. Here we can evoke Weber (2002), whose critical study
of capital accumulation and the built-environment seems highly applicable to
the case of TQ
At various points in its circulation, the built environment is junked, aban-
doned, destroyed, and selectively reconstructed. The physical shells of
agin industrial orders may sit dormant for decades before being
cleared for a new high-tech ‘campus’ (p. 521).
Understanding the location of TQ in Belfast from a social and economic per-
spective is important to setting TQ into the wider context of the political-economic
geography of Belfast. Importantly, TQ is located in a traditionally Protestant/
Unionist, relatively deprived area of Belfast, in comparison to the rest of Northern
Ireland. This is seen in theNorthern IrelandMultiple Deprivation Measure (NIMDM).
The NIMDM studies deprivation across seven measurements: “income, employ-
ment, health, education, proximity to services, living environment and crime”
(NISRA, 2010, p. 5); across 890 ‘Super Output Areas’, comprised of approximately
2000 people. Amore precise measurement is that of Output Areas (OA), with 5022
OA’s comprised of approximately 350 people. In the 2010 NIMDM findings, if
taken as a sub-set of multiple-deprivation, the majority of those areas most
deprived (in terms of income) are located in Belfast and Derry (NISRA, 2010).
In terms of multiple-deprivation, 24 of the 25 most deprived OAs were in the
local government district of Belfast (the one exception being in Derry). The
Super Output Area that TQ is located in (Island 1) is ranked 90 (out of 890) in
terms of Multiple Deprivation. The more precise Output Area (95GG290003) is
ranked 1108 (out of 5022) in terms of Multiple Deprivation. If taken across both
these measurements, TQ is located in an area that is in the top 10–22 per cent
of the most deprived areas in NI. Showing the great contrasts in Belfast, the
least deprived SOA in Northern Ireland—‘Cherryvalley 2’ (NISRA, 2010,
p. 56)—is located only 5km away (approximately) from TQ. Surrounded by
areas that housed a population employed to a large extent in the shipyards, TQ
is located in an area of Belfast that reflects wider social and economic trends in
NI that are “a product of the declining structures of traditional industrial capital-
ism and the new currents of post-industrialism” (Bean, 2007, p. 18). In this context,
Harvey (2006) mentions Northern Ireland’s “long-standing problems . . . as a site
for capital accumulation”, given its history of conflict (p. 103). However, Harvey
(2010) notes that NI is an example of a country where the deprivation and dispos-
session of people has “little directly to do with capitalist accumulation”, and
where there is no necessary link to “anti-capitalist politics” (p. 247).
6. A Political-Economy of Titanic Quarter
The corporate structure of the group of companies under Harcourt Developments
that have a controlling interest in TQ is complex. Titanic Investments Ltd was
incorporated on 11 September 2003, under Jersey law, as a subsidiary of Harcourt
Developments. In turn, Titanic Investments Ltd owns Titanic Island Ltd, which
itself controls Ivy Wood Properties Ltd. Ivy Wood Properties in turn controls a
group of nine subsidiaries that includes Titanic Quarter Ltd, a company registered
in NI. Titanic Island Ltd is “the main property development company at the
Queen’s Island site”, and is a financial entity of considerable size in its own
right (Simpson, 2011). Simpson (2011) notes that the company’s operating profit
in 2010 was £16 million, while the value of “land and property held for develop-
ment” in 2011 was £96 million (falling from a 2009 peak of £112 million). The
primary rationale for the development of TQ is economic: to bring economic
benefits for the developer, and supposedly to bring economic benefits for the
Belfast and wider Northern Irish citizenry. As stated by TQ: “The fundamental
goal for the development of Titanic Quarter is to achieve high quality investment
and development in Belfast” (Titanic Quarter, 2005, p. 3). In this respect TQ is no
different to wider trends of urban regeneration, the development of the built-
environment and the accumulation of capital. For example, Harvey (2008) notes
that “since urbanization depends on the mobilization of a surplus product, an inti-
mate connection emerges between the development of capitalism and urbaniz-
ation” (p. 24). Belfast, as is discussed elsewhere in this article, is particularly
susceptible to this kind of development, given its history of violence and the
destruction of vast swathes of its built environment. Indeed for Harvey, urbanis-
ation takes its place alongside military expenditure as one of the key sites in the
economy for “absorbing the surplus product that capitalists perpetually
produce in their search for profits” (Harvey, 2008, p. 25). However, in their pro-
motional literature, Harcourt Developments chose to focus not on the economic
benefits it stood to gain, but rather on the wider benefits to the area and the
city. Thus Harcourt Developments (2007) suggested the “development is expected
to create at least 20,000 new jobs over the next 15 years, and bring in £1.5 billion of
investment” (p. 15), or “30,000 jobs and £2 billion of investment over a 20 year
period” (p. 17), claims made before the global financial crises that may be signifi-
cantly limited in their realisation.
Another main reason for the development of TQ is to bring benefit to the construc-
tion industry. NI has relied, in part, on construction for the underpinning of its
economy, especially in the replacement of other parts of its economy which have
been in decline (especially in manufacturing output, in line with the rest of the
UK). Within five years of the TQ Master Plan being published (2006-2011), construc-
tion contracts at TQ were valued at £175 million, which it was claimed had gone on
the whole to NI companies (Titanic Quarter, 2011). In 2011, 500 construction workers
were working at TQ, which according to the developer Harcourt Developments
(through the subsidiary Titanic Quarter Ltd.), made it “the largest building site on
the island of Ireland” (Titanic Quarter, 2011). This £175 million was refereed to by
Mike Smith, then TQ Ltd’s CEO, as “a ‘down payment’ for the local economy”
(Titanic Quarter, 2011). Smith’s proposition is debatable from an economic point of
view and one that needs tested, given the limited effect overall that TQ might have
throughout NI, and rather as a project that primarily benefits the developer. His state-
ment is also ideological to the extent that it suggests construction firms might play a
more fundamental role in the political culture in NI. In this sense, companies like
Harcourt Developments have come to see themselves as being indispensable politi-
cal-economic actors, benignly benefiting the people of NI with their construction pro-
jects. Corroboration to this claim is given in a 2005 statement by Harcourt, claiming
that, in relation to Belfast, TQ is “essential to the future prosperity of the city as a
whole” (Titanic Quarter, 2005, p. 1), a claim that is not quantifiable, at least in the
short to medium term. Despite this—as is shown below in a section on TQ and
local and regional government—developers like Harcourt enjoy almost unequivocal
support for their activities from various bodies of the state and government, and from
individual politicians, in a way that is not proportionate with the benefits they have
brought to the economy and to NI society. The extent to which this is the case was
encapsulated in a statement by Peter Robinson, when he argued that Titanic Belfast
was “one of the key projects we are looking for, for our tourist industry. . . with
massive potential for the construction industry . . . This is the very kind of project
we need to assist in these difficult financial times” (BBC, 2008).
7. The Titanic Visitor Centre
At the centre of TQ lies the £77 million Titanic signature building, ‘Titanic Belfast’,
which opened in 2012. It was conceptualised by CivicArts, and designed by Todd
Architects (BBC, 2012d). The majority of the funding for the building came from
the public sector (Department of Enterprise (DETI)—NI Tourist Board £36.95
million; Belfast Harbour Commissioners £13.6 million; Belfast City Council £10
million) (Magee, 2012). Harcourt Developments paid £16.35 million towards costs
through Titanic Quarter Ltd (representative of 21.2 per cent of the total cost).
While the building is owned by a charitable trust—Titanic Foundation Ltd—“All
proceeds from the building belong to the centre operator Titanic Belfast Ltd
[owned by Harcourt Developments] A charitable trust, Titanic Foundation Ltd
will own the building. The operator has to pay Titanic Foundation Ltd £200K and
put £600K into a trust each year to refresh the attraction” (Magee, 2012). Here is it
is worthy of note that while DETI applied for part of the public funding for the
project to be supplied by the EU, the EU “has questioned the application on the
basis therewas a lack of competition in Titanic Quarter Ltd (TQL) selecting an associ-
ated company, Harcourt Construction (NI) Ltd to undertake the building work”
(Magee, 2012). As things stand the EU have noted the strong connections between
public and private sectors, and have problematised matters to the extent to which
Harcourt Developments may be set to benefit considerably from extensive public
funding, with considerable amounts of public finance becoming subsumed by
private capital. Perhaps one of the most noteworthy features of Titanic Belfast is that
Based on projected visitor numbers, it is one of the most expensive build-
ings of its kind in Europe . . . Per visitor, it cost more than Disneyland in
Paris, is almost three times more expensive than the Guggenheim in
Bilbao, and cost about seven times more than the Tate Modern (Magee,
2012).
Despite this concern over the wider viability of the project, Arlene Foster—the
Democratic Unionist Party minister responsible for tourism in NI—blamed the
media for “fuelling and giving voice to negativity about the scheme”, and noted
that she was “‘frustrated to the ends of the earth’ by people talking down the
Titanic Signature project” (as in Shapiro, 2012). This is seen in the light of the
wider context of the DUP blaming the local press and media for its perceived
negative coverage of its legislative agenda; for the DUP, the press should also
be a cheer leader for economic development (see the March 2009 letter from
Peter Robinson, jointly with Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness criticising
the Belfast Telegraph’s journalism on the NI Executive Programme For Govern-
ment) (OFMDFM, 2009).
8. Titanic Quarter and the Relationship with Local and Regional
Government
The supporting role of local government in the development of TQwas rather fun-
damental to its progression, and the project received widespread political and
financial support from local and regional government in NI. At Belfast City
Council, Gerry Copeland evoked the concept of a ‘blank canvas’ (which will be
explored in more detail later), underlining the role in the economic development
of local government as a ‘cheer-leader’ for development: “That area of the city has
obviously declined since its industrial use. But now we have almost a blank
canvas and an opportunity to create a new future and to shift the whole city,
east of the river” (in reference to the River Lagan which bisects Belfast) (as cited
in Harcourt Developments, 2007, p. 37). Moreover, Peter McNaney, Chief Execu-
tive of Belfast City Council stated: “It ticks all the right boxes: introducing new
industries and increasing the skills base to help diversify the city’s employment
base into the knowledge economy. . .” (cited in Harcourt Developments, 2007,
p. 17). In this respect, McNaney’s vision is realised in the Citi Group complex at
TQ, which placed a ‘Centre of Excellence’ in Belfast, serving its European oper-
ations. The then Lord Mayor of Belfast, Cllr. Pat Convery argued TQ, “will gener-
ate not just significant economic benefits, but a wide range of social benefits which
have the potential to improve the quality of life for everyone in the City” (Titanic
Quarter, 2010). Quite what these social benefits are, or how they could be realised
in an area of significant multiple depravation, such as the area in which TQ is
located, is something that remains to be seen. Viewing TQ as something for all
the people of Belfast (or NI) is a problematic notion, and is something that the
rhetoric from elected local politicians or local government officials rarely fully
addresses. Rather, such language goes to offer further support for capital accumu-
lation, despite mentioning the obligatory benefits for the wider population of
Belfast. One level up from local government in NI is the Northern Ireland Assem-
bly, within which the Executive holds devolved powers on a range of legislation
from Westminster, and works in tandem with the ROI government through the
North-South ministerial council. Here, the majority view was that the establish-
ment of TQ was positive. One dissenting view came from Dawn Purvis, then a
member of the Northern Ireland Assembly for the minor unionist party, the Pro-
gressive Unionist Party (representing the East Belfast constituency which contains
TQ). While Purvis called TQ “fantastic news”, she noted that the project might
have limited benefit for working class people in East Belfast: “It’s not just about
offering jobs - it’s about building the capacity and skills of the people in order
to take up those opportunities” (BBC, 2008). Some similar criticism was seen in the
words of Robin Newton, a DUP MLA. Newton argued, critically, that the project
needed to bring social as well as economic benefits to the people of the area
All too often we have seen as part of the so-called gentrification process,
shiny new apartment blocks going up, built by companies and workmen
with no connections to the local community, which are effectively segre-
gated from the neighbourhoods in which they appear and occupied by
people with no stake in the local community – this cannot be the case
in East Belfast (Newton, 2007).
9. Wider political discourse and Titanic Quarter
As Secretary of State for NI, the New Labour Minister Peter Hain stated: “Our
shared vision is that the whole TQ development will make a unique contribution
to regenerate and revitalise this site and contribute to a more prosperous future
for Northern Ireland” (Harcourt Developments, 2007, p. 43). As a statement
from a New Labour minister, there is nothing particularly surprising in Hain’s
point. What it does show, however, is that at the UK national level NI’s progress
is to be viewed through a lens of economic development realised in capital
accumulation in the built-environment. More significant was the interpretation
of his statement by Harcourt Developments, that argued: “This is probably
one of the only times that a British government minister has said something
that all the people of Belfast can agree with” (Harcourt Developments, 2007,
p. 43). Here Harcourt Developments seems to be suggesting that economic
development trumps politics, and that the reduction of violent political conflict
can lead two historically opposed communities to share in the interests of capi-
talist development. But more than this, the view of Harcourt Developments is
that it must develop in this way. Any ambiguity on this point was dispelled
by Conal Harvey, director of operations at Harcourt Developments; he argued
“Northern Ireland’s future must be driven economically. Everything hangs on
people having the lifestyle opportunities, and reasons to put their history of con-
flict behind them. TQ is symbolic of the new Northern Ireland” (Harcourt Devel-
opments, 2007, p. 17). Perhaps the statement is particularly pointed for the
Nationalist population (who favour the joining of NI with ROI). The notion is
clear: post-GFA, nationalists need no longer to be concerned with political
struggle, but instead simply need to focus on the transition to being a consu-
mer-driven ‘normal society’. Indeed, Martin McGuinness (as NI’s Deputy First
Minister, 2007—present) has stuck very close to the pro-business line of the
Democratic Unionist Party. McLaughlin and Baker (2010) in The Propaganda of
Peace highlight one of the watershed moments in this transition, when at the
opening of the IKEA store in Belfast (December 2007) Ian Paisley of the DUP
and Martin McGuinness sat on an IKEA sofa beneath the slogan ‘Home is the
Most Important Place in the World’ (cf. Jewesbury and Porter, 2010). Following
the GFA and the St. Andrews agreement, the setting up of the power sharing
institutions and relative peace, there is an agreed interpretation: peace has
come; it is time to have a normal society; today, normal societies spend
money. The best way to reach conflict resolution is to turn the antagonists
into consumers. Rather than fighting on the streets, Northern Ireland’s people
ought to be fighting for the best bargains in the aisles.
10. A ‘Pleasingly Blank’ Canvas: Viewing Belfast’s ‘Post-Conflict’ Spaces
In its promotional literature for TQ, Harcourt Developments is especially frank
about how it views urban development in Belfast in light of the Troubles
Belfast is unique amongWestern European cities in that more than half of
its city centre has yet to be redeveloped, creating a pleasingly blank
canvas for regeneration. True, the circumstances that led to this are
unfortunate. The violence that plagued the province for 32 years, until
peace was declared by the IRA, meant that Belfast was completely under-
developed and under-regenerated compared to English cities of the same
size (Harcourt Developments, 2007, p. 44).
To linkNI’s recent past of violence so explicitly to development potential in a public
document is quite revealing, and shows the extent towhich the city of Belfast is seen
by developers as a space for development and capital accumulation, despite its
history. To say the circumstances are ‘unfortunate’ is grossly inadequate. It is
correct that due to the violent past of NI, the built-environment was blighted in
such a way that it left many prime development sites free for development. While
the immediate area that TQ is located in was spared the levels of violence seen else-
where,HarcourtDevelopments appear to takeawiderviewofBelfast and thepoten-
tial it offers. Following the cessation of the worst levels of the Troubles, the
development of the built-environment in Belfast offers developers the opportunity
to accumulate large amounts of capital. To do so, Belfast has become seen, and
indeed constructed in discourse, as a post-conflict city (MacKenzie and Porter,
2011). Jewesbury and Porter (2010) note that economic and political forces have coa-
lesced to shape “the image of contemporary Belfast” in such a way (p. 35). The devel-
opment of a post-conflict city involves for Jewesbury and Porter (2010), the
development of a “moralising politics of social and economic development” (p. 36)
By this we mean that there is a strong connection between the twin nar-
ratives of political progress and social-economic development in contem-
porary Belfast; that post-Agreement Belfast has, to a significant degree,
become a story in which the twin moral goods of political progress
and privatised, neo-liberal economic development are folded into one
another (Jewesbury and Porter, 2010, p. 36).
To apply this argument directly to TQ, we can say that the development has
wrapped up with it the “twin moral goods” they refer to. TQ is cast as being
emblematic of the ‘New Northern Ireland’, where political progress enables a
leisure culture based around consumption. TQ is cast as a prime example of
how private economic development, with the support of public finance, can sup-
posedly benefit the whole of the economy and, by extension, the people of NI. Pol-
itical process and economic development, when realised through construction,
can thus realise the “normative promise of the depoliticisation or neutralisation
of public space” central to establishing “Belfast as a post-conflict city” (Jewesbury
and Porter, 2010, p. 35).
11. Conclusion
The claim that TQ will benefit all of the people of NI is problematic. While there
has been modest stimulation of the wider construction sector as a result of the
project, and a largely disused industrial site has been made more aesthetically
pleasing, the primary benefactors from TQ are Harcourt Developments. The dis-
course that surrounds TQ that is almost entirely supportive—from local poli-
ticians and from the media (this article has not had the space to deal with the
latter)—needs to become much more critical, shifting to a place that is more reflec-
tive of wider political-economic conditions in NI, and the lack of impact that a
project like TQ has on the average citizen. NI has struggled with the move to ‘con-
ventional economics’, especially with regards to the property market. While many
enjoyed high rewards from rising property values for a period, the market has
now all but collapsed and may take many years to recover. Large property devel-
opers continue to speculate in NI, despite the collapse. While greatly reduced
property prices might be expected to lead to a more equitable market, early sug-
gestions suggest that those with the resources will simply purchase more property
than ever, thus entrenching inequality. Rather than moving to further marketisa-
tion, politicians with responsibility for NI need to realise that this is not necessarily
the best economic path. Here it could be suggested that UK government needs to
consider NI as a special economic case for decades to come, with the subvention
continuing for a long time yet. Moreover, TQ provides a concrete case study of
how the so-called ‘New Northern Ireland’ was established through the coalescing
of political and economic forces, and how historical conditions can be neatly
negated for the opportunity of development. The violent history of Northern
Ireland suggests that it should never be considered a ’pleasingly blank canvas‘,
but rather as a space blighted by violence with great human cost attached.
Future research on TQ may be strengthened by conducting interviews with repre-
sentatives from Harcourt Developments and relevant government agencies, and
also with local and regional politicians. What is clear is that research needs to con-
tinue to focus on the development of the built-environment in Belfast and North-
ern Ireland, and to continue to question the assumption that capital accumulation
benefits the wider population.
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